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The Trotskyite Impact on Hoffa

The story of Farrell Dobbs would not be complete without chronicling the end of the Trotskyite remnant in Minneapolis, a dramatic episode which sheds additional light on the mind and character of Jimmy Hoffa. This was one of Hoffa's most vivid experiences, replete with goon squads, political intrigue, and coldly calculated power plays. If 1934 was the Trotskyite year of glory, a year which Dobbs and other Minneapolis leaders still recall with youthful militant vigor, 1941 saw their dismal collapse, a rude awakening from a satisfying dream.

THE MINNEAPOLIS PURGE

Dan Tobin had long been fearful of Marxist infiltration into the labor movement and, as early as 1935, the Teamster Constitution contained a clause barring Communists from membership. Tobin first tried to break the Dunnes' hold on the Minneapolis Teamsters in 1935-1936. He set up a rival Local 500 to take over the Trotskyite Local 574 and sent in Meyer Lewis, a top AFL organizer, to engineer the fight. The Dunne brothers, however, were liked and respected by both the rank and file and the city's Joint Council (particularly its president, William Brown); so this tactic failed. As a face-saving gesture, Tobin discovered the ideological differences separating the Stalinists and the Trotskyites, and lamely declared that only the former were not welcome in the IBT. He merged locals 574 and 500 into a new Local

544 which was run, it soon became apparent, by the old 574 leadership.

For several years, encouraged perhaps by his growing respect for Farrell Dobbs, Tobin let the Trotskyites alone. When several dissident members prepared a case against the Dunnes in 1938 and asked the court to appoint a receiver, Tobin refused to support the rebels. In fact, the judge (who was evidently not a great Trotskyite admirer) later complained that the indifference of the International and the Joint Council made it difficult for him to uphold the dissidents.¹ Instead, he simply fined the Dunnes \$6000 for alleged misuse of funds and ordered Skoglund removed as local president, since, as a noncitizen, he was violating the International Constitution.

But suddenly, in the spring of 1941, Tobin began a savage attack on the 544 leaders. A close political ally of President Roosevelt, Tobin wanted to pledge the Teamsters to a war-preparedness program, as his Executive Board finally did in June, 1941. His attack may have resulted from fear of sabotage from the Trotskyites who opposed our going to war. In addition, Vince Dunne had angered the "old man" by successfully resisting his advocacy of compulsory arbitration at the 1940 Convention. Tobin had been granted increased power over the locals by constitutional changes at that convention, and this seemed like the opportune moment to act.²

A group of Local 544 rank and filers, calling itself the "Committee of 99" (and later the "Committee of 100") was becoming increasingly disgruntled with the Dunnes. One of the rebels was a recently-fired 544 organizer, who promised to tell all about the Dunnes' subversive activities. Others simply aspired to get for themselves the offices which the Trotskyites occupied. As Joe Padway, counsel for the Teamsters and the AFL, later explained to Tobin,

... it is evident to me that their fight was not based on loyalty to the International. It was based on personal and political considerations. In fact, some of these fellows were members of the Socialist

Workers Party and they had been members for many months. They fell out with the leaders and withdrew from the Socialist Workers Party, and the hatred between them is very intense.³

The Local 544 dissidents held a meeting in March, 1941, and passed a resolution demanding that the International "step into Minneapolis and clean up an intolerable situation."⁴ In April, a subcommittee of the General Executive Board, conducted by Secretary-Treasurer John Gillespie, met in Chicago with all concerned to examine whether 544's officers were "Communistic, alien, and grossly negligent and inefficient." The hearing centered totally about the first of these charges, and the results were largely predetermined, for the Dunnes had made no secret of their political affiliation.

Gillespie came to Chicago prepared to read a number of anti-Trotskyite statements. One typical declaration, said to have been provided by David Dubinsky, who was advising Tobin on Marxism, assured the IBT that, "The Socialist Workers Party is in reality more communistic than the Communist Party. . . . Trotsky, when serving under Lenin in Russia, was even more radical and communistic and hateful of our form of government than either Lenin or Stalin. . . ." The May and succeeding issues of the International's official magazine were replete with similar warnings. Finally, at the June Teamster Executive Board meeting, the Socialist Workers Party was classified as a "subversive, revolutionary party" from which all officers and members had to withdraw, and Local 544 was instructed to request trusteeship, placing control directly in Tobin's hands.*

Dave Beck was dispatched to Minneapolis to inform the Dunnes of the Board's decision and, according to Dobbs, to offer a compromise measure whereby the Tobin-appointed trustee would wield only a veto power. Beck was scheduled to arrive on June 11. On June 9, Farrell Dobbs attended the first general meeting of Local 544 he had been in over a year. Without the benefit of secret ballot, and hurling epithets such as "tyrant, dictator, and union-buster" at Tobin, the membership voted

* All 544 leaders had formally resigned from the SWP shortly after the March resolution, although their loyalties remained unchanged.

almost unanimously to secede from the Teamsters and jump to the CIO.

Denny Lewis, head of the United Construction Workers Organizing Committee, enthusiastically wired the Dunnes, "Will be happy to charter a local union of truck drivers and helpers in the Minneapolis area. . . . We visualize this move on the part of the truck drivers in Minneapolis into our organization as the first step towards the complete organization of truck drivers in the United States in the CIO."⁵ These sentiments were echoed a few days later in a telegram from Denny Lewis' famous brother, John L. Lewis. A Motor Transport and Allied Workers Industrial Union was established, and a CIO staff was sent in under veteran United Mine Workers organizer Frank Barnhart. Detroit and the nearby Michigan cities of Flint and Pontiac, as well as Minneapolis, became the center of the new CIO campaign. With this series of maneuvers and counter maneuvers, open war had been declared.

During the following weeks, hundreds of Teamsters descended upon Minneapolis, in an attempt to keep the truck drivers in the IBT. T. T. Neal, then director of the Central States Drivers Council, was appointed trustee over the shell of 544-AFL, and Joe Casey (son of San Francisco's famous Teamster leader "Bloody Mike"), Dutch Woxberg (an able West Coast organizer who played a continuing important role, until 1961, under Beck and Hoffa), and Meyer Lewis (who had developed useful contacts in 1935-1936) were assigned the job of filling the empty shell with members. Neal was in charge of the office, Woxberg the field, and Casey was responsible for general supervision and negotiations. All contracts had expired on June 1. "Scores of cars, carrying an estimated 200 AFL men, cruised the warehouse district and the larger plants, putting the pressure on, where necessary, to sign up drivers and helpers."⁶

On June 17, Padway wrote to Tobin:

The sending in of the men made a tremendous impression with our membership and with the public. Everyone now sees that the Inter-

national Brotherhood of Teamsters is girded for the fight and that it has the men and the resources with which to make it. I understand that several of the secessionists have expressed a desire to quit the Dunnes and come back to the Teamsters. . . . There even are rumors and reports that the Dunnes themselves, now think they acted unwisely and hastily. They thought that they would get unanimous support from the Joint Council and that the CIO of Minnesota would welcome them with open arms. Instead, there is a tremendous opposition of the local CIO officials to the Dunnes. . . .

(Hatred between the Trotskyites and the Stalinist-inclined CIO groups was even more intense than between either one of these and the non-Communist unionists. This may help to account for the unenthusiastic response which the Dunnes received in many quarters.)

A letter to Padway from his nephew and assistant, I. E. Goldberg, on June 28, praised the work of the outside organizers. "It is quite surprising that there has been little or no violence to date. . . . It is hardly believable that in dealing with such a tough situation and with fellows who are known killers, that there has not been any serious trouble. . . ." (The members of 544-CIO vigorously contested this view, claiming repeated violence against their supporters; perhaps the difference centered about the meaning of "serious" trouble.) Joe Casey, in a June 24 telephone conversation with Tom Flynn, said, "The outside boys can work in there and they will take all the abuse in the world. With the local fellows, when they get in an argument, they immediately get into a fist fight because of old sores around here. . . ."

Letters from Goldberg and Woxberg particularly commended the boys from Detroit, led by Jimmy Hoffa. It must have been a traumatic experience for young Hoffa, for today he recalls with strong emotion, "Vince Dunne was my friend." It is clear that Farrell Dobbs was his principal mentor. The competence and diligence of the Trotskyites had aroused Hoffa's admiration, and he found distasteful the task of breaking up a militant, well-functioning union. Nevertheless, Tobin was still the boss, and 544 was a rebel local, disobeying International orders and pro-

moting dual unionism. Such behavior is looked upon as a cardinal sin in the American labor movement; and besides, in their Michigan drive, the rebels were encroaching on Hoffa's territory. His participation in the Minneapolis purge may have helped foster the ruthless quality for which he is known. That he did his job so effectively is evidence that he already possessed substantial quantities of the trait.

At first, the truck drivers were undecided which path to follow. As Casey described it in his telephone conversation with Flynn on June 24:

Here is the kick-back we are getting now—that these fellows are like a pendulum on a clock which swings back and forth—CIO-AFL-CIO-AFL, depending entirely on who was the last group that talked to them. They say that the boys have two buttons—CIO in one pocket and AFL in the other, and they don't wear any button, but when an AFL comes up, they start putting on the AFL button.

Woxberg had a similar picture for Flynn three days later. "Our organizers will go into a plant and sign the membership and immediately CIO will come along and also sign them. This only shows that the membership are just waiting to ride the winning horse. . . ."

In a lengthy communication to Tobin on June 16, Padway reported on the lack of loyalty of the Joint Council toward the International: ". . . the officers of the Joint Council are very friendly to the Dunnes and it is my belief that some of them worked with them on this secession. . . . They may urge their unions to swing over if they think it is to their advantage to do so." So close were the battle lines drawn, Padway felt, that if the wrong man had been appointed trustee, "secession on the part of other locals, and particularly on the part of the leaders, would have taken place within a few days." As documentation for this, Padway observed that the Joint Council had just sold its newspaper, the *Northwest Organizer*, to the Dunnes, for a one-dollar bill.

Using a tactic which the Dunnes and Dobbs had themselves exploited, the Teamsters declared a national boycott on trucks

driven by CIO members. But more decisive were the behind-the-scenes legal and political moves which finally resulted in Teamster victory. A politically influential legal firm was retained, at great cost. Courts quickly ordered the old 544 to turn over its office, funds, and properties, to the International. Publication and distribution of the *Northwest Organizer* was enjoined, the judge remarking "that he felt the International ought to have stepped in sooner."⁷ Padway and Woxberg "met with District Attorney Goff, the Chief of Police, and the Captain of Detectives, who promised us all protection and cooperation possible. . . ."⁸

Such assistance was indeed helpful, for at the end of September the Minnesota Labor Conciliator declared 544-AFL the certified bargaining agent for Minneapolis truck drivers, bypassing the unpredictable NLRB representation elections which 544-CIO persistently demanded. Conciliator Blair found that, "The public interest . . . requires that there should be one and only one bargaining representative for all the drivers" and announced that 544-AFL represented the majority.⁹ Padway hailed this patently undemocratic procedure: "This is a marvelous victory for the Teamsters. It is the first certification of its kind anywhere in the country. Of course, it will be attacked, but between the time the attack comes up for final adjudication by any tribunal the victory will be complete, regardless of what the court should hold."¹⁰ His message proved prophetic, and the workers never did have the opportunity to express their choice.

The final blow to the Dunnes and their friends was delivered by the United States Department of Justice. Late in June, in the midst of the turmoil described above, Socialist Workers Party headquarters in Minneapolis and St. Paul were raided by the FBI. In July there were indictments against 29 Party leaders, including the Dunnes, Dobbs, and five other 544 officials, based upon a Civil War sedition statute and the recently-passed Smith Act. The charges were conspiracy to overthrow the United States Government by force and violence, to engage in private military training for that purpose, and to spread disaffection among the armed forces.

The American Civil Liberties Union indignantly declared that:

. . . the charges clearly raise issues of civil liberties in attacking utterances or publications in the absence of any overt acts or even of any "clear and present danger." . . . In our judgment, both statutes violate the first Amendment of the Constitution; and even if upheld could not be applied to this set of facts . . . we desire to call the government's attention to a series of circumstances which appear to indicate a gross impropriety on the part of government officials in securing the indictment. . . .¹¹

The report went on to cite communications between Tobin and Roosevelt, wherein Tobin had described the flight of 544 to the CIO as "a regrettable and dangerous condition . . . we feel that while our country is in a dangerous position, those disturbers who believe in the policies of foreign, radical governments, must be in some way prevented from pursuing this dangerous course."¹² Roosevelt quickly obliged by agreeing that jurisdictional fights were not desirable. Shortly afterwards, came the FBI raids. The ACLU concluded

. . . it seems reasonable to conclude that the government injected itself into the inter-union controversy in order to promote the interests of the one side which supported the administration's foreign and domestic policies. In our judgment, this is a highly improper use of the criminal law. Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that it has been a matter of common knowledge for some years that the Socialist Workers Party, an insignificant little group of extremists, has been strongly represented in the Minneapolis labor movement—alone of any city in the country. Nothing charged in the indictment is of recent origin. The situation in Minneapolis is no different now from that obtaining over the past five or ten years.¹³

Of course, two things had changed: we were about to go to war, and the Smith Act had just been passed.*

At the ensuing trial, which began in October, much of the

* Farrell Dobbs today disputes the view of the ACLU and other liberal groups that the Justice Department's moves were political payoffs from Roosevelt to Tobin. He believes that the war and general class issues motivated the government's attack on the Trotskyites. Whatever the immediate stimulus, the timing certainly helped the Teamsters.

testimony both pro and con came from union sources, and it developed that the FBI had been working with the "Committee of 99" for several months. Hoffa claims that he and his Detroit associates were invited to speak against the Dunnes, but refused. Charges against five of the defendants were dismissed by the judge due to lack of evidence, and five other defendants, including Miles Dunne, were found innocent by the jury. Those remaining, most notably Vince Dunne and Farrell Dobbs, were convicted and given varying sentences of twelve to eighteen months' duration.¹⁴ The sentences were upheld on appeal in 1943. Many of the old 544 leaders spent little if any time in jail, but by the trial's end their spirit was broken and their power destroyed. Grant Dunne had committed suicide during the course of a nervous breakdown;¹⁵ another defendant was acquitted of the conspiracy charge but received a five-year prison term for "embezzling" union dues and other properties which he had refused to turn over to the Teamsters; and Carl Skoglund had been held in jail for long periods on deportation charges, with bail placed at an impossible \$25,000.

By the end of 1941, the Minneapolis purge was a *fait accompli*.

As trustee of Local 544, Tobin appointed T. T. Neal, in whose frequent absence the local was run by Secretary-Treasurer Sidney Brennan. Goldberg wrote to Padway on November 29, ". . . it is unfortunate that the situation has not produced any outstanding leader with the proper qualifications to carry on in face of our present problems." Brennan seemed the best, or least objectionable, man available; for he replaced Neal less than a year later, and in 1943 became an International vice-president. (In 1956, Brennan was convicted of dividing with three others a \$5000 pay-off from an employer, and lost his prestigious Teamster position.)¹⁶

Tobin's correspondence for years afterwards reveals an agonizing (if somewhat imaginative) anxiety about Trotskyite resurgence in Minneapolis and as far afield as Los Angeles. Former Dunne adherents were carefully kept out of the union. The

July, 1941 *International Teamster* cautioned, after listing their names, "Watch for them in the future everywhere. They may seek membership in your union, perhaps under false names." When Trotskyites were discovered working with the International Union of Operating Engineers (AFL), Tobin urged their expulsion. But the much-feared revival never came; and with the collapse of the old militant Local 544 came the end of the Trotskyite role in the Teamsters.

THE AFTERMATH IN DETROIT

While the fight for control of the Minneapolis Teamsters went on during the summer and fall of 1941, a closely related battle was brewing in Hoffa's home territory. In the wake of the Minneapolis purge came a major CIO assault on traditional Teamster jurisdiction, centering on the strongest CIO town in the country—Detroit.

When the Dunnes feared their local was about to be placed under trusteeship in June, 1941, they seceded to Denny Lewis' United Construction Workers' Organizing Committee (UCWOC), to serve as the nucleus of an anticipated surge of truck drivers into the CIO. Lewis' movement was underway by August and at its height from late September to early November, coinciding with the Trotskyite trial.*

The attack concentrated on Hoffa's automobile haulaway drivers, because of their proximity to CIO auto plants. UCWOC organizers brought in numerous signed applications and talked of holding labor board elections before the end of the year. CIO trouble-shooters cruised the area in cars from which they could quickly be dispatched as the need arose. Others acted simply as "strong-arm men," ready to beat up Teamster toughs.

Hoffa retaliated by picketing and boycotting establishments which signed with the insurgents, and by threatening to take

* An attempt at secrecy was made, but in formation leaked through; Tobin's informer sent in detailed daily reports on the activities of Lewis (and Hoffa as well) and these, locked away for many years in his personal files, were helpful in reconstructing the story.

jobs and union cards away from disloyal members. Assistance from the usually thrifty Tobin was obtained in the form of a \$1300 monthly subsidy and top-level influence with CIO leaders. On the local level, informal understandings were reached between Hoffa and major Detroit CIO officials. When UCWOC called gatherings of dissident truck drivers, Hoffa's men patrolled the area, discouraging attendance, and then they tried to gain control of the meeting. Violence was standard operating procedure on both sides.

By the end of October, the UCWOC campaign, which had gotten off to such a vigorous start, was faltering. Aid had been expected from the United Automobile Workers (UAW-CIO) and requested at its September Executive Board meeting. But this proved overly optimistic, the first fatal flaw in Denny Lewis' plan. The UAW Executive Board grudgingly went on record (partly in response to the Retail, Wholesale Workers' experience in Detroit) as condemning the Teamsters for their "strong-arm methods and back-door agreements with management in their efforts to block legitimate organizing work by the CIO." The UAW voted support for "all CIO sister unions including the UCWOC." But as the weeks rolled by it became evident that this was an empty promise. Tobin was confidentially informed that Walter Reuther was "blocking any move by Thomas or Addes * toward support for the Turner [Denny Lewis] group . . . he feels that this campaign will cause a lot of trouble and bloodshed if it is continued." Largely due to Reuther's opposition, crucial UAW assistance to the anti-Hoffa forces never materialized.

Lacking financial subsidy from the UAW and other CIO unions, UCWOC's funds were short, and experienced organizers left as their remuneration was cut. Several of UCWOC's best men were arrested, leading them to charge that the police favored Hoffa. Internal feuding plagued the Denny Lewis organization; confusion and dissatisfaction prevailed. On October 21, the Wayne County CIO Council condemned the drive in a resolution promoted by Gus Scholle, president of the Michigan State CIO

* Walter Reuther, R. J. Thomas, and George Addes were major UAW leaders in 1941.

Council, and UAW leader, Dick Leonard. On November 4, the State Council expressed opposition to all raiding activities among workers producing and transporting defense goods.

And thus matters stood until the CIO Convention, scheduled for Detroit the week of November 17. This would be the showdown. Would John L. Lewis and his brother Denny receive the full backing of the CIO, or would they be rejected and possibly break away? This question dominated the Convention, and the UCWOC issue was only one ingredient in a perplexing brew.

From the very beginning, an atmosphere of tension and hostility pervaded the convention halls, and matters were not helped by the Mineworkers' refusal to stand and applaud for CIO President Philip Murray nor by Denny Lewis' "to hell with Murray" attitude. The Steelworkers and Amalgamated Clothing Workers caucused against Lewis, and were soon joined by Harry Bridges, Mike Quill, and representatives of textile and rubber workers. Scores of union officials converged on Detroit to assist in the fight. Communist sympathizers, in particular, feared injuring our defense program and delaying aid to Russia, which had shortly before been invaded by Germany. Fist fights broke out among the delegates, one involving Gus Scholle and Denny Lewis. Finally, members of the Lewis group were forced to stay in their hotel rooms between sessions because of the strength of personal animosities. When Frank Barnhart took the floor to discuss the Minneapolis trial, he received no applause. In contrast, Murray was reelected by a great ovation, and in his address to the convention, warned that raiding of rival organized groups must cease. A resolution to back the UCWOC drive was never even reported out of committee; the Lewis forces in the CIO had been resoundingly defeated by the convention's end.

During the following weeks Reuther, Scholle, and Tracey Doll (president of the Wayne County Council) actively promoted a "peace movement" in Detroit. When Hoffa won a big pay raise for his members, enthusiasm among recalcitrant truck drivers for the new organization waned, and they flocked back to the Teamsters. On February 2, 1942, UCWOC abruptly moved its headquarters out of the Hoffman Building where the rest of the

CIO was housed, in preparation, as it later developed, for Lewis' imminent departure from the federation. UCWOC activities against the Teamsters were sporadic, weak, and of little consequence thereafter.

In summary, the campaign to organize the truck drivers along industrial lines was caught in the interplay of power between John L. Lewis and Philip Murray. It was this breach which first opened the door of the CIO to the Dunnes, but which also doomed any chance of success. Reuther and much of the vital UAW bitterly opposed the drive, resenting Lewis and desirous of avoiding any unnecessary friction with Hoffa, the union leader with whom Reuther was later to share Detroit. Other CIO officials were anxious to prevent a defense-production stoppage which was likely under full-scale raiding. Added to this was the personal antagonism which many CIO delegates felt toward Denny Lewis, believing that his primary motivation was "big money and a big job."

The UCWOC efforts were run with surprising ineptitude. There was much infighting; funds were low; and there were brawls and jurisdictional battles with potential friends in the UAW and the Steelworkers. When Hoffa finally came through with a highly successful contract, the fight was over. After some initial success among the auto haulaway drivers in Flint and the smaller towns and companies of northern Michigan, the attack on Hoffa which had begun with the Minneapolis purge in the summer of 1941 was dead.

IMPRINTS OF THE MARXIST IDEOLOGY

Hoffa's concept of the function and fate of our political economy has been indelibly shaped by the radical left. In the 1930's, he frequented lecture halls and street corners where Communists and anarchists spouted their views, but most important were the lessons learned from the Dunne brothers and Farrell Dobbs. The crude Marxist business cycle theory preached by these Trotskyite acquaintances from Minneapolis, at a time when their ideas

seemed verified by millions of jobless men, deeply colors Hoffa's thinking to this day.

Hoffa has an intuitive Marxist picture of a capitalist economy: automation—overproduction—unemployment—more automation—more overproduction—more unemployment—and so it goes. The impending disaster is thought to be hastened by an inevitable trend toward monopolization, which our antitrust laws are powerless to prevent. During the next decade Hoffa foresees General Motors, possibly together with Ford, swallowing up the automobile industry, the number of major railroads reduced to five and airlines to four, and eight supermarket chains controlling the retail grocery field as warehouse automation revolutionizes food distribution. Similarly, he anticipates a shrinkage of trucking carriers from the many thousands which exist today to a few hundred, with a handful of transcontinental lines dominating long-distance hauling.

Hoffa favors this movement toward industrial concentration; he is intrigued by the increased efficiency which larger business units permit. However, higher productivity means fewer jobs unless output rises, and herein lies the crux of the problem. He sees no way for us to take off the market the fruits of our huge and ever-growing productive capacity; the only possible outcome is a glut of unused commodities and layoffs of unnecessary workers. Hoffa insists that the depression which he, like many others, predicted at the end of World War II has been only temporarily postponed.

The rationale for this course of events has been incompletely worked out in his mind. But basically, he seems to feel that human wants are sharply limited by nature; that we are already at the upper boundary of our ability to absorb goods and services. Our remaining peacetime needs can be quickly satiated, he maintains—any structure can be erected within 90 days, and an overabundance of buildings and roads can be achieved in one year's time. He believes few major growth sectors are left. Thus, in keeping with Marxist ideology but in contrast to the beliefs of most "liberal" American trade unionists, Hoffa views government

measures to alleviate unemployment, including monetary and fiscal policy or a legislative cut in the work week, as only a temporary palliative, too superficial and ineffective to counter the fundamental instability of our economy.

The final result, which Hoffa discusses frequently in private conversation, is the radicalization of the American labor force, and the flowering of left-wing political movements. Despite his emotional attraction to a vigorous free enterprise economy, his numerous private financial deals, his advocacy of business experience for union leaders, and his support of many Republican candidates, Hoffa believes (just as he was taught by Dobbs in the 1930's) that capitalism is doomed. He is in the incongruous position of one who likes the present system, but does not believe it can work. This sense of expectancy helps explain his buoyancy in the face of the Kennedy diatribes, for the denouement will not be long in coming, he feels, and he plans sufficient flexibility to go with the winner. Viewed in this light, Hoffa's alignment with certain radical unions (for example, the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, and Harry Bridges' International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union) is more than simply a momentary expedient brought on by his expulsion from the AFL-CIO.

We have several times heard Hoffa predict a return to the violence in the streets that he witnessed during the Great Depression. Should this happen, he is prepared to lead the hungry masses forth. His dynamic personality, flowing oratory, brilliant mind, shrewd knowledge of strategy, and relative youth, would all combine to make him a logical candidate for radical leadership—were his pessimistic prognostications concerning the American economy to prove correct.